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INTRODUCTION
Eight months after his famous and lonely objections to Plessy v.
Ferguson,1 Justice Harlan again dissented alone. Once more, the Court
was hollowing out the Reconstruction Amendments’ promises of liberty
and equality, but unlike Plessy, Robertson v. Baldwin2 is an obscure decision. It holds no place in the anticanon of constitutional error, not even
a nomination. To the contrary, courts continue to rely upon it, though
always in passing.
What provokes this Essay is an occasion to attend more carefully to
Justice Harlan’s wisdom, which quietly haunts Thirteenth Amendment
jurisprudence. That provocation is the routine threat and actual practice
of incarcerating Americans for not working, or not working hard enough;
a practice visited disproportionately on low-income communities of color. This practice represents an extreme extension of broader patterns that
construe racial and economic inequality as manifestations of personal
vice and thus as occasions for inflicting further punishment.3 These occasions involve not just the withdrawal of the social welfare state, but also
its substitution with the carceral state, which “depends for its legitimacy
on the widespread belief that all those who appear trapped at the bottom
actually chose their fate.”4
This Essay offers a provocation of its own. I suggest that these
practices are constitutionally dubious, despite being widely implemented
and actively embraced by mainstream Democrats, hardly obscure authoritarian outposts. These doubts emerge through redescribing, in labor
terms, a set of policies that generally are analyzed under quite different
rubrics: child support enforcement and criminal justice debt collection, as
well as probation, parole, and related techniques of “community supervision.” In each case, work is offered for noble purposes and as a benevo1. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
2. 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
3. See, e.g., JOE SOSS ET AL., DISCIPLINING THE POOR: NEOLIBERAL PATERNALISM AND THE
PERSISTENT POWER OF RACE (2011).
4. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE
OF COLORBLINDNESS 248 (2012).
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lent “alternative to incarceration.” But when low-income communities,
of disproportionately people of color, are offered incarceration as the
alternative to work, Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence should go to
high alert.
These coercive labor practices are redolent of peonage, one component of the Jim Crow South’s broader system of racial labor control,
which leveraged a racist criminal justice system into an institution of labor subordination. That system, too, often flew the banner of disciplining
the dissolute laborer and containing his threat to social order. This Essay
is no attempt at a comprehensive treatment of either the present situation
or the historical analogy. Instead, it is a call for such examination.
Robertson’s obscure vitality suggests the divergent paths followed
by the constitutional jurisprudence of race and labor.5 With no apparent
connection to the Jim Crow South, Robertson never faced a reassessment
in light of the Court’s peonage jurisprudence, which traditionally has
been situated in the jurisprudence of racial justice.6 Indeed, the case arose
far away in miles and context. Robert Robertson was a San Francisco
seaman,7 apparently white,8 who thought better of his voyage on the barkentine Arago.9 Upon arrival in Oregon, he exercised with three shipmates what one might have thought was their constitutional right to
quit.10 But instead, they were jailed until the Arago set sail again, hauled
back to the ship by a marshal, forced to work the remainder of the voyage, and criminally prosecuted for their insubordination upon return to
San Francisco. All this occurred pursuant to federal statute, and all this
was forcefully upheld by the Supreme Court.11

5. See generally RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2007).
6. See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, Race Relations Law and the Tradition of Celebration: The Case
of Professor Schmidt, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1622 (1986); Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era. Part 2: The Peonage Cases, 82 COLUM.
L. REV. 646, 662 n.58 (1982). But see Aziz Z. Huq, Peonage and Contractual Liberty, 101 COLUM.
L. REV. 351, 380 (2001); James Gray Pope, Contract, Race, and Freedom of Labor in the Constitutional Law of “Involuntary Servitude,” 119 YALE L.J. 1474, 1487–88 (2010).
7. See Ahmed A. White, Mutiny, Shipboard Strikes, and the Supreme Court’s Subversion of
New Deal Labor Law, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 275, 279 n.16 (2004) (discussing
terminology of “seamen” versus “sailor”).
8. Robertson’s race was not explicitly stated by the Court or in the briefing, but given that the
Court took pains to distinguish the case from several contexts characterized in racial terms, it seems
likely that only whiteness could have seemed unnecessary to note. See Robertson v. Baldwin, 165
U.S. 275, 283 (1897).
9. Id. at 275.
10. See Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 437, 496 (1989).
11. To be sure, Robertson’s obscurity may also derive from the fact, instructive in its own
right, that the statutes it upheld were repealed shortly thereafter. See, e.g., Tucker v. Alexandroff,
183 U.S. 424, 431 (1902); White, supra note 7, at 293 n.70. Then again, that fact enhances Robert-
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Robertson’s significance lies in its unique crack in the wall between
penal compulsion and the private labor market. Justice Harlan decried it
for that reason, objecting that,
In my judgment, the holding of any person in custody, whether in
jail or by an officer of the law, against his will, for the purpose of
compelling him to render personal service to another in a private
business, places the person so held in custody in a condition of involuntary servitude, forbidden by the constitution of the United
States.12

Larger breaches of Harlan’s principle are invited by today’s era of proliferating criminal justice control and shrinking labor rights.
I. PRESENT DAY INCARCERATION FOR NONWORK
Three contemporary contexts generate requirements to work for a
private business on pain of arrest or incarceration, contrary to Justice
Harlan’s principle. Although not typical of low-wage work today, neither
are they marginal. Moreover, they either are on the rise or show substantial growth potential. Each involves legally authorized physical violence—arrest and incarceration. Thus, like Robertson, they raise none of
the subtleties associated with contemporary Thirteenth Amendment controversies over what conduct constitutes compulsion.13 Instead, the only
issues are whether the thing compelled is “servitude” and, if so, whether
the resulting involuntary servitude nonetheless falls outside the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on just that.
A. Probation, Parole, and Other Community Supervision
The most straightforward example is the duty to seek and maintain
employment as a standard condition of probation and parole.14 As with
any such condition, a violation—not working—may trigger
(re)incarceration. The scope of these work requirements is vast. Nearly
five million adults are on probation or parole at any time,15 and that
number increases if one considers all who pass through these systems in
the course of a year, decade, or lifetime. Black and Latino inmates conson’s peculiarity insofar as the opinion rested on the notion that forced labor was a timeless and
necessary feature of seafaring.
12. Robertson, 165 U.S. at 303.
13. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 944–53 (1988); Kathleen C. Kim, The Coercion
of Trafficked Workers, 96 IOWA L. REV. 409 (2011).
14. Fiona Doherty, Obey All Laws and Be Good: Probation and the Meaning of Recidivism,
104 GEO. L.J. 291, 310 (2015).
15. ERINN J. HERBERMAN, PH.D. & THOMAS P. BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 248029, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2013, at 1
(rev. ed. 2015), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus13.pdf.
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stitute a large majority of those incarcerated for probation or parole violations, and the disproportionality increases further when considering
only violations related to nonwork or, closely related, nonpayment of
financial obligations.16
Despite the penal exception to the Thirteenth Amendment,17 the
Amendment may still apply to these work conditions because they arguably are not imposed as a “punishment,” but rather as a means to promote social integration and prevent future offending.18 That separation
from the “punishment” exception is particularly clear for closely related
and increasingly popular forms of community supervision that operate as
“diversions” designed to avoid a criminal sentence, not as part of such a
sentence.19 Nonetheless, the proximity to criminal sentencing makes
these work requirements less legally provocative than the next.
B. Criminal Justice Debt
Second, the nation is rightly awash in concern over modern-day
debtors’ prisons. The primary focus has been on debt arising from assessment of fines and fees through the criminal justice system.20 Such
exactions range from financial punishments accompanying imprisonment,21 tickets for minor quality of life offenses or traffic violations,22 to
the obligation to reimburse the state for the costs of providing criminal
defense counsel under Gideon.23 Unlike most ordinary private debts,
these often are not dischargeable in bankruptcy, and unlike all private
debts, criminal justice debts can subject the debtor to imprisonment for
nonpayment.24
16. NOAH D. ZATZ ET AL., UCLA INST. FOR RESEARCH ON LABOR & EMP’T, UCLA LABOR
CTR. & A NEW WAY OF LIFE REENTRY PROJECT, GET TO WORK OR GO TO JAIL: WORKPLACE
RIGHTS UNDER THREAT (2016), available at http://www.labor.ucla.edu/publication/get-to-work-orgo-to-jail/.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (abolishing involuntary servitude “except as a punishment
for crime”).
18. See Raja Raghunath, A Promise the Nation Cannot Keep: What Prevents the Application of
the Thirteenth Amendment in Prison?, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 395, 415–16 (2009).
19. See Allegra M McLeod, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and Perils of a Shifting
Criminal Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 1587 (2012).
20. See Alexes Harris et al., Drawing Blood from Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in
the Contemporary United States, 115 AM. J. SOC. 1753, 1756–60 (2010); see also Beth A. Colgan,
Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 277 (2014).
21. See Harris et al., supra note 20.
22. See LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS OF THE S.F. BAY AREA ET AL., NOT JUST A
FERGUSON PROBLEM: HOW TRAFFIC COURTS DRIVE INEQUALITY IN CALIFORNIA 13 (2015) [hereinafter LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS], available at http://www.lccr.com/wp-content/uploads/
Not-Just-a-Ferguson-Problem-How-Traffic-Courts-Drive-Inequality-in-California-4.20.15.pdf.
23. See Beth A. Colgan, Paying for Gideon, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1929, 1932–33 (2014).
24. See generally Christopher D. Hampson, The New American Debtors’ Prisons (Aug. 4,
2015) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
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Notwithstanding the close historical connection between imprisonment for debt and forced labor, the contemporary discourse on debtors’
prisons has largely ignored the complementary phenomenon of debt peonage.25 That connection is forged most directly when the debtor’s inability to pay becomes the basis for being ordered to work, typically without payment, in what is commonly termed “community service.”26 Thus,
the indigent debtor’s choice between paying and going to jail is gloriously expanded to embrace the choice between jail and forced, unpaid labor.
Criminal justice debt has been subjected to far less academic study
and systematic data collection than probation and parole, so its precise
scope is unknown. Nonetheless, it clearly is enormous and has been
growing.27 In California alone, each year about 500,000 people have their
driver’s licenses suspended just for unpaid citations and subsequent
fees.28 Given the massive racial disproportionality in everything ranging
from traffic citations to felony convictions, there is every reason to expect similar disparities in criminal justice debt and its consequences.29 In
Los Angeles, well over 50,000, and likely over 100,000, people are assigned to court-ordered community service each year.30
Although courts have long assumed that a sentence of hard labor in
lieu of a fine falls within the Amendment’s penal exception,31 modern
authorities have refused to extend that principle to administrative fees.32
“Consequently, a statute requiring a convicted defendant who is unable
to reimburse the State for such expenses to satisfy his debt by performing
uncompensated labor for the State would be proscribed by the
[T]hirteenth [A]mendment.”33 It is unclear how much influence this principle has had in practice and, in any event, it does not apply to fines.
_id=2639709.
25. One recent article squarely connects contemporary criminal justice debt to the Jim Crow
practice of peonage. See Tamar R. Birckhead, The New Peonage, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1595
(2015). However, its analogy relies entirely on the role of criminal justice, cycles of debt, and economic and racial stratification without making any connection to forced labor, even when directly
suggesting the relevance of the Thirteenth Amendment. See id. at 1603, 1638–40. Indeed, the article
appears to embrace certain forms of compulsory labor as an alternative to incarceration. See id. at
1676.
26. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1209.5 (West 2016); ALICIA BANNON ET AL., BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER TO REENTRY (2010), available at
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Fees%20and%20Fines%20FINAL.pdf (advocating community service as an alternative to incarceration for nonpayment).
27. See Harris et al., supra note 20, at 1756.
28. LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 13.
29. Id. at 19; Harris et al., supra note 20, at 1760–63.
30. Zatz et al., supra note 16.
31. See United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 149 (1914).
32. See Opinion of the Justices, 431 A.2d 144, 151 (N.H. 1981) (surveying authorities).
33. Id. at 151.
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Given that this form of forced labor originates in an independent criminal
proceeding,34 as well as the potential application of other ad hoc exceptions to the Amendment’s scope,35 I defer the topic in favor of lowerhanging fruit closer to the problem of Robertson. Another distinction is
that compelled labor originating in criminal justice debt thus far appears
to be concentrated in the public and non-profit sectors.
C. Child Support Enforcement
Of principal interest here is a third context of contemporary work
coerced under threat of incarceration: child support enforcement. Like
criminal justice debt, child support obligations occupy a special status
among debts. Nonpayment exposes the obligor to incarceration through
civil contempt proceedings36 or through criminal prosecution.37 This is
no idle threat.38 To the contrary, in larger U.S. cities, a shocking 15% of
African-American fathers are at some point incarcerated for nonpayment
of child support.39
The intersection between race and poverty affects not only which
obligors are unable to pay, but also which obligors are targeted for enforcement. Enforcement, both with regard to establishing child support
obligations and then collecting payment, focuses heavily on noncustodial
parents of children who receive some form of public assistance because
their custodial household has very low income.40 The state has a special
financial interest in these cases because it seizes child-support payments
to reimburse itself for public assistance spending, and so the politics of
child support are intimately linked to those of welfare reform, themselves
thoroughly shaped by racial antagonism.41 Thus, the racial dynamics of
threatening incarceration for nonwork do not begin with the carceral
34. For an important case on the scope of the penal exception, see United States v. Reynolds,
235 U.S. 133 (1914) (holding that an agreement to work for a surety who assumed financial responsibility for a fine was independent of the prior criminal proceeding and thus fell outside the penal
exception).
35. See infra Part III.
36. See, e.g., Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 431 (2011); Tonya L. Brito, Fathers Behind
Bars: Rethinking Child Support Policy Toward Low-Income Noncustodial Fathers and Their
Families, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 617, 618 (2012); Elizabeth G. Patterson, Civil Contempt and
the Indigent Child Support Obligor: The Silent Return of Debtor’s Prison, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 95, 121 (2008).
37. See Criminal Nonsupport and Child Support, NAT’L CONFERENCE STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/criminal-nonsupport-and-child-support.aspx#50 (last
updated June 2015).
38. See Brito, supra note 36.
39. See Zatz, supra note 16.
40. See generally Brito, supra note 36.
41. See SOSS ET AL., supra note 3; MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE,
MEDIA, AND THE POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY (1999).
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threat but must be traced to the sources of the duty to work, whether in
the racial profiling of police stops, the racial disproportionately that runs
from prosecution to sentencing, or the welfare retrenchment that “privatizes dependency.”42
The link from debt to labor is forged by the legal consensus that the
duty to pay child support includes a duty to work in order to pay.43 This
principle provides the basis for incarcerating obligors who are too poor
to pay, and poverty is endemic among obligors in arrears.44 One study
found that in California, over 80% of those in arrears had annual incomes
below $20,000, and over 60% had annual incomes below $10,000.45
Because the duty to pay encompasses a duty to work, refusing or
quitting a job can be construed as refusing to pay, as indeed can the bare
fact of unemployment.46 One of the leading cases for that proposition is
the California Supreme Court’s 1998 decision in Moss v. Superior Court.
Moss concerned a defendant whose unemployment elicited incarceration
on the assumption that he, like any able-bodied adult, surely “could get a
job flipping hamburgers at MacDonald’s [sic].”47 The court’s use of civil
contempt to produce compliance embraces just what Justice Harlan believed should be forbidden, “the purpose of compelling [the child support
obligor] to render personal service to another in a private business.”48
And McDonald’s, of course, is no exceptional or marginal type of business, as the 19th century merchant marine might seem to be;49 rather, it is
the heartland of the modern service economy.50
This focus on participation in existing low-wage labor markets also
shapes current policy initiatives to translate the general duty to seek and
maintain employment into a duty to participate in work programs that
42. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY
108 (2004).
43. See United States v. Ballek, 170 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 1999); Moss v. Superior Court,
950 P.2d 59, 73 (Cal. 1998).
44. See ELAINE SORENSEN ET AL., ASSESSING CHILD SUPPORT ARREARS IN NINE LARGE
STATES AND THE NATION (2007), available at https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/75136/
report.pdf; Elaine Sorensen & Chava Zibman, Getting to Know Poor Fathers Who Do Not Pay Child
Support, 75 SOC. SERVICE REV. 420, 422 (2001).
45. DR. ELAINE SORENSEN ET AL., EXAMINING CHILD SUPPORT ARREARS IN CALIFORNIA: THE
COLLECTIBILITY STUDY 7 (2003), available at http://www.urban.org/research/publication/examining
-child-support-arrears-california-collectibility-study/view/full_report.
46. See sources cited supra note 43.
47. Moss, 950 P.2d at 63.
48. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 303 (1897) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
49. On the exceptionalism of labor law at sea, see White, supra note 7.
50. Today, the presumption of job availability may be shifting toward an even lower baseline:
the sporadic “gig” with Uber. See Cesar Conda & Derek Khanna, Uber for Welfare, POLITICO (Jan.
27, 2016, 7:02 AM), http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2016/1/uber-welfare-sharing-gigeconomy-000031#ixzz3zSO8rSGy.
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direct, monitor, and discipline those efforts.51 For instance, the Obama
administration recently proposed new child support regulations that promote a “Work First” approach that prioritizes “rapid labor force attachment” over “promot[ing] access to better jobs and careers.”52 Notably,
this program also embraces incarceration for failure to participate in such
programs.
Although the courts and executive agencies make this connection
between debt and work, the existing scholarship generally has focused on
obligors’ lack of income, their procedural rights, and child support’s interaction with the social welfare system for children and custodial parents.53 To the extent that obligors’ employment is considered, the primary focus has been on the potential for the support obligations to deter
work by effectively taxing earnings that the obligor must hand over in
support.54 No attention has been given to Moss and other leading Thirteenth Amendment cases stemming from child support enforcement.55
II. INCARCERATION FOR NONWORK IN THE PAST: LESSONS FROM
PEONAGE
Contemporary incarceration for nonwork is illuminated by its historical analogues. In Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence, the obvious
foil is peonage. In a series of cases from 1905 to 1944, the Supreme
Court consistently found Thirteenth Amendment infirmity when workers
faced public or private violence for failing or refusing to work for an
employer to whom they owed a debt.56 These cases primarily concerned
51. See Elaine Sorensen, Rethinking Public Policy Toward Low-Income Fathers in the Child
Support Program, 29 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 604 (2010).
52. Flexibility, Efficiency, and Modernization in Child Support Enforcement Programs, 79
Fed. Reg. 68,548, 68,558 (Nov. 17, 2014) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 301–309).
53. See, e.g., Ann Cammett, Deadbeats, Deadbrokes, and Prisoners, 18 GEO. J. ON POVERTY
L. & POL’Y 127 (2011); Daniel L. Hatcher, Don’t Forget Dad: Addressing Women’s Poverty by
Rethinking Forced and Outdated Child Support Policies, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 775
(2012); Daniel L. Hatcher, Child Support Harming Children: Subordinating the Best Interests of
Children to the Fiscal Interests of the State, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1029 (2007); Solangel
Maldonado, Deadbeat or Deadbroke: Redefining Child Support for Poor Fathers, 39 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 991 (2006); sources cited supra note 36. But see Yiyoon Chung, Child Support As Labor
Regulation, 38 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 73 (2011).
54. See, e.g., Maria Cancian et al., Discouraging Disadvantaged Fathers’ Employment: An
Unintended Consequence of Policies Designed to Support Families, 32 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 758 (2013); Harry J. Holzer et al., Declining Employment Among Young Black LessEducated Men: The Role of Incarceration and Child Support, 24 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 329
(2005); Daniel P. Miller & Ronald B. Mincy, Falling Further Behind? Child Support Arrears and
Fathers’ Labor Force Participation, 86 SOC. SERVICE REV. 604 (2012).
55. For instance, they are not cited, let alone discussed, in any of the articles listed supra, notes
36, 53, and 54.
56. See Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 245
(1911); United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 149–50 (1914); Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25, 29
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“false pretenses” statutes that created a separate criminal offense for
fraudulently obtaining an advance on a labor contract, where criminal
intent was presumed based on the bare fact of quitting before the advance
was repaid; another statute criminally enforced a surety arrangement in
which the employer paid off a defendant’s criminal justice debt in exchange for a promise to repay through labor.57 These statutes were part of
a broader web of legal devices, including vagrancy laws, that leveraged
both racial targeting in the criminal justice system and the economic vulnerability that was the legacy of slave emancipation without forty acres
and a mule.58
The peonage cases established a number of principles that suggest
how carceral child support enforcement might be analogized to peonage
and likewise run afoul of the Thirteenth Amendment. More generally,
these principles help sensitize the modern reader to the rationalizations
once offered for a racist system of entangled criminal justice and labor
subordination, a system now abhorred yet echoed in “common sense”
justifications for today’s criminalization of unemployment.
A. The Present Involuntariness Principle
One important principle firmly established by the peonage cases is
that the requisite “involuntariness” is determined by the worker’s willingness to work at the time the work is performed or refused.59 The baseline is that even a legally binding contractual commitment to work in the
future—a commitment voluntarily undertaken—cannot be enforced by
compulsion. “It is the compulsion of the service that the [antipeonage]
statute inhibits, for when that occurs, the condition of servitude is created, which would be not less involuntary because of the original agreement to work . . . .”60 Thus, the presence of even a legal obligation to
work, including one voluntarily assumed, is irrelevant.
My three examples above all involve legally imposed duties to
work that attach to the voluntary conduct of procreation or criminal offending. Even if we take those systems at face value, without interrogat(1942); United States v. Gaskin, 320 U.S. 527, 529–30 (1944); Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 25
(1944); see also Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671, 691–92 (M.D. Ala. 1903); United States v. McClellan,
127 F. 971, 974–75 (S.D. Ga. 1904); Toney v. State, 37 So. 332, 334 (Ala. 1904); Ex parte Drayton,
153 F. 986, 997 (D.S.C. 1907); State v. Armstead, 60 So. 778, 780–81 (Miss. 1913); Taylor v. United States, 244 F. 321, 330 (4th Cir. 1917); Pierce v. United States, 146 F.2d 84, 86 (5th Cir. 1944).
57. Reynolds, 235 U.S. at 139–40.
58. See Huq, supra note 6, at 354–55, 358–63, 387 (reviewing literature); Birckhead, supra
note 25, at 1609–26 (same).
59. This resolves legally a variant of the classic problem in contract theory of whether binding
oneself to extended servitude expresses or violates the relevant notion of freedom. See Anthony T.
Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 794–96 (1983).
60. Bailey, 219 U.S. at 242; accord Pollock, 322 U.S. at 7–9.
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ing selective or trumped-up enforcement, the peonage cases specifically
distinguish the legal validity of duties to work from their means of enforcement. An obligation to work may be enforced through an action for
damages, but its fulfillment may not be physically coerced.
B. The Unjustified Quit Principle
The peonage cases went beyond the right to quit in defiance of a legal obligation voluntarily assumed. Not only did they focus on present
involuntariness, they also rejected any substantive review of the validity
of the worker’s present reasons for quitting. The statutes that the peonage
cases struck down generally limited prosecution to individuals who
failed to work “without good and sufficient cause”61 or “without good
and sufficient excuse.”62 These limitations did not save the statutes by
reserving coercion for those without good reason to refuse work. Instead,
the worker’s right to quit in breach of contract applied “however capricious or reprehensible” that action might be.63 Among other things, this
principle reflected a practical concern for the uncertain resolution of
claims to just cause. “The law provides no means for determining the
justice of his excuse, at any time, in any mode, in any tribunal, unless he
first risks the penalty of hard labor” by quitting.64
C. The Work-Under-Threat Principle
This emphasis on practical effects also underlies the approach taken
in the peonage cases to the legally relevant concept of coercion. That
conception embraces an ex ante perspective focused on work in the
shadow of threats, not an ex post perspective focused on labor procured
once the threat is carried out. The prototypical peonage case involves the
criminal prosecution of a worker who quits. The result of that prosecution is not the return of the worker to the original employer. Instead, the
result is incarceration or a sentence to hard labor for the state or some
other third party to the original contract.
Thus, the Thirteenth Amendment is not limited to situations where
the law “authorize[s] the employing company to seize the debtor, and
hold him to the service” or authorizes the “constabulary to prevent the
servant from escaping, and to force him to work out his debt.”65 To the
contrary, it reaches situations that “make criminal sanctions available for
61. See, e.g., Taylor, 315 U.S. at 29.
62. See, e.g., Reynolds, 235 U.S. at 142.
63. Taylor, 315 U.S. at 30.
64. Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671, 686 (M.D. Ala. 1903); accord Toney v. State, 37 So. 332, 334
(Ala. 1904).
65. Bailey, 219 U.S. at 244.
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holding unwilling persons to labor.”66 When “labor is performed under
the constant coercion and threat of another possible arrest and prosecution in case he violates the labor contract . . . and this form of coercion is
as potent as it would have been had the law provided for the seizure and
compulsory service of the convict.”67
Moreover, threats can render work involuntary, even if actually carrying out those threats would not cause the work to be performed. Once a
worker is thrown in jail, he might not be forced to perform the work he
had been obligated to do, nor any other work at all. In peonage and in my
three contexts, what matters is the work that must be done to avoid the
threatened incarceration or prosecution. Whether any work would be
extracted once the threat was carried out is beside the point.
D. The Insufficient Alternative Principle, At Least With Regard to Payment
Underlying the work-under-threat principle is the more general
point that work cannot be rendered “voluntary” in the constitutionally
relevant sense merely because the worker had available a “choice” other
than the work in question.68 A robbery can proceed by offering the
choice “your money or your life.” Similarly, offering the choice between
work and incarceration imposes involuntary servitude. The fact that a
worker rejected the alternative—incarceration—and chose work makes it
no less involuntary.
This principle relies on a judgment about the inadequacy of the alternative to work. That judgment requires some challenging line-drawing
along a continuum of slightly less unpleasant alternatives, stretching
from incarceration to a criminal fine to a public condemnation. Indeed,
this is a general problem with notions of involuntariness and coercion.
This line-drawing difficulty leads, in one direction, to the notion that all
work under capitalism is “involuntary” insofar as the proffered alternative is starvation.69 In the other, it leads to Justice Holmes’s able Bailey
dissent in which he reasoned that criminal penalties for breach differ only in degree, not in kind, from the “disagreeable consequences” of civil
damages.70

66. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 18 (1944).
67. Reynolds, 235 U.S. at 146.
68. See generally ROBERT J. STEINFELD, COERCION, CONTRACT, AND FREE LABOR IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY (2001); Pope, supra note 6.
69. On “wage slavery,” see, e.g., AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE
LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION (1998); CAROLE
PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988); Vandervelde, supra note 10.
70. Bailey, 219 U.S. at 246.
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The peonage cases draw a constitutional line across the slippery
slope. They establish that if nothing else, exposure to criminal prosecution—and ultimately to physical custody—constitutes an alternative insufficient to bless a choice to work as “voluntary.” But there is an additional difficulty in these cases, one facilitated specifically by the linkage
to debt.
The statutes in question generally allowed the worker to escape
criminal liability by paying off his debt to the employer. Thus, the workers faced three choices: work, jail, or pay. This third option received remarkably little scrutiny in the cases, presumably because of the obvious
structural fact that the workers in question had no resources with which
to pay. That was why they were vulnerable to peonage premised on the
employer’s advance of wages at the outset of employment. Nonetheless,
the courts were explicit that this formal payoff option made no difference.71 This rule cohered with the principle, widely enshrined in state
constitutions, abolishing imprisonment for nonpayment of private
debts.72 Thus, if a worker could not be forced to choose between payment and jail, nor between work and jail, then putting them all together
in a three-way choice could not improve matters.
This inability of a payoff option to immunize forced labor from
Thirteenth Amendment condemnation has been strengthened by subsequent constitutional developments. As a matter of substantive due process, someone cannot be incarcerated for nonpayment if she lacks the
ability to pay.73 Indeed, in the current child support and criminal justice
debt contexts, the present inability to pay is the premise of the obligation
to work. For child support, the source of the duty to work is the duty to
acquire the means to pay even if one presently lacks those means. For
criminal justice debt, mandatory work operates to satisfy in-kind a debt
that cannot be satisfied in cash; it typically is confined to circumstances
in which the present inability to pay has been established.74
Accordingly, the formal option to avoid both work and jail by paying off the debt makes no difference. For the worker who has no ability
to pay, it would be unconstitutional to jail her for nonpayment. Adding
an independently unconstitutional option—pay or jail—cannot cure the
infirmity of an otherwise unconstitutional choice between work and jail.

71. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215 (1905); Reynolds, 235 U.S. at 144.
72. See, e.g., Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671, 687 (M.D. Ala. 1903); see also Ann K. Wagner, The
Conflict over Bearden v. Georgia in State Courts: Plea-Bargained Probation Terms and the Specter
of Debtors’ Prison, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 383, 383 (2010).
73. See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398–99 (1971); Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 674
(1983); Turner v. Rogers, 546 U.S. 431 (2011).
74. See sources cited supra note 26.
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III. SEAMEN AND PEONS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL MARGINALIZATION OF
ROBERTSON
These principles from the peonage cases erect a wall between private employment and state violence, a wall in which Robertson appears
as a crack. The peonage cases culminated in Pollock, where the Supreme
Court declared flatly that “no state can make the quitting of work any
component of a crime, or make criminal sanctions available for holding
unwilling persons to labor.”75 That principle is essential “to maintain a
system of completely free and voluntary labor throughout the United
States” because “[w]hen the master can compel and the laborer cannot
escape the obligation to go on, there is no power below to redress and no
incentive above to relieve a harsh overlordship or unwholesome conditions of work.”76 Consistent with the unjustified quit principle, this notion avoids case-specific inquiries into the conditions of work. Instead, it
specifies the worker’s baseline bargaining position within a private labor
market.77
Robertson is flatly inconsistent with Pollock’s principles. But Robertson came first, and so the early peonage cases faced the opposite problem: before the Thirteenth Amendment could be used to strike down
criminal enforcement of private labor contracts, the Supreme Court’s
then-recent pronouncement in Robertson would have to be distinguished.
The courts managed this problem by sequestering Robertson to a pile of
Thirteenth Amendment exceptions. Just before the Supreme Court first
took up the topic,78 a leading lower court peonage opinion had already
posed the problem of Robertson thus: “There are many persons, other
than those duly convicted of crime, who may be compelled against their
will to perform ‘labor or service.’”79
A. The Two General Exceptions: Work for the Family or the State
These Thirteenth Amendment exceptions, now routinely recited by
the courts,80 generally fall into two categories that carry through to the
subsequent case law. First, there are children, who could be compelled to

75. Pollock v, Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 18 (1944).
76. Id. at 17–18.
77. See Huq, supra note 6, at 363–67 (discussing the complementarity between Thirteenth
Amendment peonage jurisprudence and the constitutionalization of laissez-faire during the same
time period).
78. See Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905).
79. Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671, 681 (M.D. Ala. 1903).
80. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 943 (1988) (“Our precedents reveal that not all
situations in which labor is compelled by physical coercion or force of law violate the Thirteenth
Amendment.”).
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work by their parents or, when apprenticed, by their master.81 Second,
and continuous with the textual exception for penal servitude, there is the
discharge of duties owed to the state—principally military service—but
also the ancient custom of the corvée, by which adult citizens were taxed
in labor and obligated to join crews on public works, especially roads.82
Robertson’s seamen, however, do not fit easily into either of these
two conceptually coherent categories of children subject to paternalistic
governance and duties owed to the state. Instead, as waged labor in the
market, they were in public, vis-à-vis the family, and in private, vis-à-vis
the state.83 Positioned this way, Robertson’s authorization of compelling
private seamen’s labor came to stand as a bare holding unsupported by
any general principle, an exception without any apparent rationale. In the
Peonage Cases, the district court simply tacked on the acknowledgement
that “[t]he law also permits the exaction of involuntary service in cases
of sailors in the merchant marine who have signed a contract to perform
in voyage, etc.”84 Of course, the contractual nature of the obligation was
81. See id. at 944 (noting that the Thirteenth Amendment did not disturb “the right of parents
and guardians to the custody of their minor children or wards”); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S.
275, 298 (1897) (Harlan J., dissenting) (noting that apprentices were free to leave upon reaching
adulthood). On the limitations on applying the Thirteenth Amendment to a patriarchal master’s
control over the labor of his wife and children, see VanderVelde, supra note 10, at 454–57;
STANLEY, supra note 69; James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment at the Intersection of Class
and Gender: Robertson v. Baldwin’s Exclusion of Infants, Lunatics, Women, and Seamen, 39
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 901 (2016).
82. See generally Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (military conscription); Butler v.
Perry, 240 U.S. 328 (1916) (public road work); Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578 (1973) (pretrial material witness); Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 944. James Gray Pope suggests that these cases need
not be construed as exceptions at all, but rather could be understood to flow from a distinction between, on the one hand, “servitude,” which involves work under a master’s direction and for his
benefit, and, on the other, “civic duties, which are performed under the direction of representative
government for the benefit of the people.” See Pope, supra note 6, at 1515. I doubt that construction
can hold because it obscures distinctions between immediate and ultimate purposes and between
agents and principals. To test the intuition, consider whether the government could conscript citizens
into employment in government enterprises providing ordinary consumer services, the revenue from
which funded general government operations. This would be work under the direction of democratic
government and for the benefit of the people, but I doubt that would save it from being “servitude.”
Some more particularized account of the specific forms of work and the specific obligations to perform it seems necessary to support the “public duties” cases. Pope’s interpretation of “servitude”
also invites the further question of whether parental authority to compel children to work productively, authority that involves neither democratic control nor a public beneficiary, falls outside of “servitude” or instead represents an implied exception. See Pope, supra note 81. Similar problems arise in
circumscribing the legal category of “employment,” which likewise struggles at once to confine its
purview to labor markets and to recognize the permeability and ambiguity of their boundaries. See
generally Noah D. Zatz, Working at the Boundaries of Markets: Prison Labor and the Economic
Dimension of Employment Relationships, 61 VAND. L. REV. 857 (2008).
83. See generally Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983).
84. Peonage Cases, 123 F. at 671, 681–82; see also Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 944.

942

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 39:927

irrelevant on the court’s own reasoning in adopting the present involuntariness principle,85 and so all that was left was simply Robertson’s holding. Similarly conclusory are the Supreme Court’s references to Robertson in Clyatt, which expressly refused to “stop to consider any possible
limits or exceptional cases, such as the service of a sailor.”86
B. Constructing the Seamen Exception
The exceptional character of seamen specifically, however, had to
be constructed by the subsequent cases. Robertson had offered several
rationales for its holding, rationales that arguably applied quite widely
throughout the labor market and well beyond the merchant marine. The
first rationale—that service was not involuntary when pursuant to prior
agreement87—was quite general and would have applied to all labor contracts. The peonage cases, however, thoroughly repudiated this holding
with the principles of present involuntariness, unjustified quitting,88 and
work under threat. At that point, it was necessary to address more specific aspects of service at sea.89
1. The Public Interest in Orderly Labor
Robertson offered two other rationales for coercing sailors that
might readily have been extended to Black agricultural labor in the Jim
Crow South. First, there was the functional justification that ships were
vulnerable to sailors’ desertion “at a critical moment” or “at some place
where seamen are impossible to be obtained.”90 The concern, in other
words, is that when a right to quit actually delivers substantial bargaining
power to labor, namely when workers are not readily replaceable, labor
markets become markedly less appealing to employers.91 Implicitly,
while the Thirteenth Amendment might be meant to shield workers from
85. Peonage Cases, 123 F. at 680.
86. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 216 (1905).
87. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 280–81 (1897) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
88. In Bailey, the Court noted that the “sufficient cause” provisions could be construed merely
as limiting liability to actual breaches and thereby to conduct within the scope of obligation undertaken in the contract. See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 234 (1911). Bailey then took pains to
reject compulsory compliance with such obligations. See id. at 236–38.
89. On this aspect of the transition from Robertson to the peonage cases, see Pope, supra note
81, at 148–88.
90. Robertson, 165 U.S. at 283. Of course, the reverse is also true, that seamen are structurally
vulnerable to abuses when they have no practical ability to leave, find other work, and return home.
See White, supra note 7, at 287. Cf. ROBIN D. G. KELLEY, HAMMER AND HOE: ALABAMA
COMMUNISTS DURING THE GREAT DEPRESSION 161 (2015) (1990) (noting sharecroppers’ similar
vulnerabilities).
91. On the authoritarian aspects of shipboard labor relations, see generally White, supra note 7,
at 281–89.
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the worst abuses,92 the right to quit was not meant to deliver a degree of
power that would disrupt the basic structure of workplace hierarchy and
employer control over labor.93
This concern about maintaining hierarchical labor discipline was
very much alive in the Jim Crow agricultural South, where it obviously
intersected with racial hierarchy.94 Courts grappled with these considerations explicitly and seriously, but ultimately they did not follow Robertson’s approach. In the Peonage Cases, Judge Jones accepted that
“[e]very reflecting man recognizes the great evils resulting from the
abandonment of farms by laborers and renters, without justifiable excuse,
after obtaining advances and incurring indebtedness to the employer,
sometimes leaving the crops when it is almost impossible to secure other
labor to save them.”95 Having conflated the timing question with the issue of advances, the court upheld an Alabama false pretenses statute.96
Just four years later and emboldened by the Supreme Court’s intervening Clyatt opinion, Judge Brawley, struck down an identical false
pretenses law in South Carolina.97 He did so after rejecting the state’s
argument that “the case of the petitioners here is analogous to that of
sailors who had embarked on a voyage; that their continuance in the service of their employer was as essential to the safety of the crop as the
service of sailors to the safety of the ship.”98 As Judge Brawley noted,
the functional concern about employers’ vulnerability to gouging is vastly narrower than a general prohibition on quitting.99 He dryly observed
that the sailor analogy lacked credibility in a case in which workers were
“arrested and imprisoned in January, when probably there is not seed in
the ground.”100
Judge Jones’ earlier Peonage Cases opinion also acknowledged another functional concern, one arising from safety considerations. In extreme cases it could be appropriate to criminalize a sudden and unreasonable quit when necessary to “prevent the endangering of life, health,
92. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 18 (1944).
93. Cf. Sanjukta Paul, The Enduring Ambiguities of Antitrust Liability for Worker Collective
Action, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. (forthcoming 2016) (arguing that late nineteenth and early twentieth
century courts subjected labor organizing to antitrust law in part to preserve class hierarchy).
94. KELLEY, supra note 90, at 37.
95. Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671, 690 (M.D. Ala. 1903).
96. See id. Unlike those later struck down by the Court, the Alabama statute imposed no presumption of fraudulent intent from the bare fact of quitting, though even that would not have saved it
under Pollock’s reasoning. See Pollock, 322 U.S. at 19–20, 23–24.
97. Ex parte Drayton, 153 F. 986 (D.S.C. 1907).
98. Id. at 994.
99. Id.
100. Id.; see also Pollock, 322 U.S. at 22 (noting that none of the peonage cases seen by the
Court involve plausible factual allegations of fraudulent intent).
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or limb, or inflicting other grievous inconvenience and sacrifice upon the
public.”101 The hypothetical demonstrating this involved a railroad dispatcher who abandons his post while trains are speeding toward collision. The Clyatt Court glancingly acknowledged this “power of the legislature to make unlawful, and punish criminally, an abandonment by an
employee of his post of labor in any extreme cases.”102 Notably, however, it drew no connection between that concern and its earlier citation of
Robertson, which it characterized purely as a case involving sailors.
In short, just a few years after Robertson, courts refused to use it as
a template for allowing various extreme scenarios to justify routine compulsion throughout an entire occupation. Instead, at most, criminal penalties would have to be narrowly tailored to circumstances that actually
reflected criminal intent to exploit vulnerabilities in the production process either for personal gain or in endangerment of public safety. Robertson itself contained no such limitations.
2. Labor Paternalism
The second potentially generalizable feature of Robertson was its
contemptuous view of the capacities and liberties of sailors. Extending
the comparison to children’s compulsion by parents and masters, the
Court explained that
seamen are treated by congress, as well as by the parliament of
Great Britain, as deficient in that full and intelligent responsibility
for their acts which is accredited to ordinary adults, and as needing
the protection of the law in the same sense in which minors and
wards are entitled to the protection of their parents and guardians.103

Seamen, in other words, were not the sort of people for whom the Thirteenth Amendment’s “system of free labor” was designed, free and equal
citizens who could look after their own interests in the market.104

101. Peonage Cases, 123 F. at 685.
102. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 216 (1905).
103. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 287 (1897).
104. In this way, paternalism in Robertson played a role exactly opposite the one Huq attributes to it in his analysis of the peonage cases. See Huq, supra note 6. Huq imports into his Thirteenth
Amendment analysis an approach to paternalism grounded in the Lochner era when courts struck
down protective labor regulations. See id. at 369–76. Because those regulations were themselves
understood as paternalist interventions in market outcomes freely chosen by independent adults, they
were upheld only when protective of people deemed appropriate objects of paternalism, like women
and children. See id.; ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, A WOMAN’S WAGE: HISTORICAL MEANINGS AND
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES (1990). But Thirteenth Amendment protection was not treated as intervention in the free market, but rather as establishing a free market. In that context, the appropriate objects of paternalism, who lacked the autonomy necessary for free market action, were placed outside
Thirteenth Amendment protection as in Robertson. In other words, being excluded from Thirteenth
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Such a view of sailors was hardly distant from, or less self-serving
than, white Southern elites’ views of Black laborers.105 In Ex parte Drayton, South Carolina defended the need for compulsion by invoking the
“peculiar conditions of agricultural labor,” conditions that included not
only the vulnerability of harvest time but also the fact that “[t]he great
body of such laborers . . . are negroes.”106 Their “[b]eing without any
financial responsibility,”107 the ordinary civil remedies for breach were of
no use, and so the whip was needed. Similarly, the Mississippi Supreme
Court, while striking down a labor enticement statute, sympathized with
the legislature’s effort to deal with the “fickle laborers in our cotton
country” in order to achieve “more stable labor conditions.”108
Here, of course, was the point at which the peonage cases, though
formally insistent on their race neutrality,109 most directly integrated race
and labor. Consider Justice Harlan’s dissent from the Robertson majority’s view of sailors, remarking:
To give any other construction to the constitution is to say that it is
not made for all, and that all men in this land are not free and equal
before the law, but that one class be so far subjected to involuntary
servitude as to be compelled by force to render personal services in
a purely private business, with which the public has no concern
whatever.110

This passage could just as well have been directed at peonage’s justification as an institution of white supremacy.
The irony in this was that poverty, racial hierarchy, and employment instability—all of which were marshaled to justify compulsion—
also were invoked to opposite effect by critics of peonage. The poverty
that rendered laborers judgment-proof also left them vulnerable to
schemes that leveraged debt into compulsion or that cut off the ability to
change employers. As Judge Jones explained,
It is a matter of common knowledge that nearly all the farm laborers
and land renters in the counties of this state to which the statute is
applicable are men of very little means, and must rely upon advances or have work to support themselves and their families at all

Amendment protection and being included in statutory protective legislation were both marks of
paternalistic location outside the system of free labor.
105. See Huq, supra note 6, at 377; Pope, supra note 6, at 1498.
106. Ex parte Drayton, 153 F. 986, 988 (D.S.C. 1907).
107. Id.
108. State v. Armstead, 60 So. 778, 780 (Miss. 1913).
109. See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 231, 241 (1911); Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4,
11 (1944).
110. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 299–300 (1897).
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times. . . . He must stay there, or else, leaving, must starve, or go to
work elsewhere . . . .111

The need for “more stable labor conditions” attributed to Black workers’
“fickle[ness]” was instead attributed by Judge Brawley to labor conditions themselves:
Unceasing toil, scant remuneration, and dreary isolation have a natural tendency to drive him to more inviting fields. Manufacturing
establishments, the railroads, lumber camps, and phosphate mines
drain the best laborer from the fields of agriculture, and whatever
may be the remedy for existing conditions, certainly the remedy is
not to be found in statutes which claim him to the soil and force him
to labor, whether he will or not. Human nature revolts at it, and he
will escape it if he can. It is by improving his condition, and not still
further degrading it, that the remedy may be found.112

Judge Jones’s references to “men of little means” and Judge Brawley’s to
“the best laborer[s]” and “human nature” seem to incorporate Black
workers into the class deemed eligible for “free labor,” attributing their
labor conditions not to their “irresponsibility” or “fickleness” but instead
to rational action under oppressive conditions.113 Pollock’s insight continued in this vein, reasoning that “improving his condition” required
protecting “the right to change employers” and thereby providing a potent weapon in “defense against oppressive hours, pay, working conditions, or treatment.”114

111. Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671, 687 (M.D. Ala. 1903).
112. Ex parte Drayton, 153 F. 986, 996-97 (D.S.C. 1907).
113. Notably, Huq’s contrary critique does not rely on the opinions striking down peonage but
instead on dissents and opinions on other topics. See Huq, supra note 6, at 382–83. This is not to say
that the peonage cases deserve uncritical celebration. In addition to severe limits on their scope and
enforcement, see id. at 379, 387; GOLUBOFF, supra note 5; Risa L. Goluboff, The Thirteenth
Amendment and the Lost Origins of Civil Rights, 50 DUKE L.J. 1609 (2001), they can be seen as
consistent with both Lochner and the anti-civil rights canons of the era, just for reasons different
than Huq’s. Although the Court readily could have adopted an even narrower view of coercion but
did not, the approach it did take still fell well short of questioning the baseline property distribution
on which Lochner depends, see Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873
(1987), including its specifically racial character as a legacy of slavery. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness
as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709 (1993). Nor did it incorporate any account of racial discrimination within labor markets. On later, unsuccessful efforts to articulate racial discrimination continuously with peonage, see GOLUBOFF, supra note 5. Merely incorporating African-Americans into the
“free labor” right to quit thus remains compatible with a project of legitimizing the substantial structural inequalities that remain and were immunized elsewhere in the jurisprudence of that era. That
reading is strengthened by the Court’s painstaking, and almost surely dishonest, efforts to characterize its peonage jurisprudence in colorblind terms. See cases cited supra note 109; Kennedy, supra
note 6, at 1647.
114. Pollock, 322 U.S. at 18.
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Finally, it bears noting that agricultural exceptionalism, grounded in
the South’s system of racial labor subordination, was itself no stranger to
labor policy during precisely the period when the anti-peonage principles
took root. Agricultural exceptions ran through all the major New Deal
labor statutes.115 Accordingly, it was an interesting, important, and hardly
inevitable feature of constitutional development during this period that
no analogous exception festered in the Thirteenth Amendment,116 despite
the door Robertson had left ajar.
C. Traditional Servitude
By the time the peonage cases were through with it, Robertson
seemingly had been reduced to a bare exception for sailors, stripped of
legal relevance by the repeal of the statutes it upheld, and unadorned by a
rationale that could apply elsewhere. Indeed, by 1944 when Pollock
paused to duly acknowledge that “[f]orced labor in some special circumstances may be consistent with the general basic system of free labor,” it
limited itself to the penal and public duty exceptions and did not deign to
cite Robertson.117
The most that remained to be said for Robertson was the majority’s
reliance on historical practice. “[E]ven if the contract of a seaman could
be considered within the letter of the thirteenth amendment, it is not
within its spirit”118 because “the amendment was not intended to introduce any novel doctrine with respect to certain descriptions of service
which have always been treated as exceptional, such as military and naval enlistments, or to disturb the right of parents and guardians to the
custody of their minor child or wards.”119
Justice Harlan was rightly withering in his attack on the majority’s
appeal to continuity and custom. After all, the whole point of the Thirteenth Amendment was to transform the nation’s system of labor and to
eradicate practices that had long been deeply embedded in law, and indeed, in the Constitution itself.120 The majority sought to deflect the point
by appealing not just to the historical practice of involuntary servitude at
115. See generally SUZANNE METTLER, DIVIDING CITIZENS: GENDER AND FEDERALISM IN
NEW DEAL SOCIAL POLICY (1998); Phyllis Palmer, Outside the Law: Agricultural and Domestic
Workers Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 7 J. POL’Y HIST. 416 (1995).
116. Indeed, Risa Goluboff has shown how the Department of Justice attempted to use its
antipeonage authority to fill the gaps left by the New Deal statutes. See Goluboff, supra note 113, at
1678–80.
117. Pollock, 322 U.S. at 17.
118. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897).
119. Id. at 282; see also United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 944 (1988) (favorably
citing Robertson for the proposition “that the Thirteenth Amendment was not intended to apply to
‘exceptional’ cases well established in the common law at the time of the Thirteenth Amendment”).
120. VanderVelde, supra note 10.
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sea, but to its historical treatment as exceptional. But the merchant marine and the majority’s other examples seemed exceptional relative only
to the post-Thirteenth Amendment baseline of free labor. Antebellum,
that was far less clear, as Justice Harlan pointed out by noting the continuity between provisions governing deserting sailors, “runaway servants,” and fugitive slaves.121 Furthermore, the patriarch’s control over his
family members’ labor had likewise not been exceptional, but rather,
entirely of a piece with dominion over a household labor force that included servants and slaves.122
The Robertson majority was right, of course, that once one admitted
exceptions beyond the textual provision for penal labor, some principle
was needed to explain which forms of previously bound labor were to be
incorporated into the mandated market in “free labor,”123 and which were
not. That remains an important challenge, but whatever the proper answer is—despite several attempts unhelpful to Robertson or subsequently
abandoned in the peonage cases—“time immemorial” provides a particularly feeble solution.
IV. APPLYING THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE NEW PEONAGE
I now turn directly to contemporary child support enforcement. My
concern is with the state’s threat, and actual practice, of imprisoning
people for being or becoming unemployed when doing so interferes with
their ability to repay debts created by the state through the child support
system.
A. The Peonage Analogy and Limits of Debt
In the child support context, imprisonment arises on account of
willful failure to pay ordered child support. But the interesting cases are
those in which the obligor presently lacks the means to pay. In those cases, courts may still find that the obligor “acted willfully because he failed
to maintain employment that would have enabled him to meet his child
support obligations.”124 It is clear, therefore, that the substance of the
duty to pay includes a duty to work, on pain of imprisonment.
The relationship between these duties resembles the evidentiary
presumptions at issue in Bailey and other peonage cases. In Bailey, the
121. Robertson, 165 U.S. at 294; see also White, supra note 7, at 331 (noting that mutiny law
initially had been continuous with the criminalization of labor organizing generally).
122. See Christopher Tomlins, Subordination, Authority, Law: Subjects in Labor History, 47
INT’L LAB. & WORKING-CLASS HIST. 56 (1995); STANLEY, supra note 69; Vandervelde, supra note
10.
123. Robertson, 165 U.S. at 282.
124. United States v. Ballek, 170 F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 1999).
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Court accepted the propriety of criminalizing fraudulent labor contracts
but rejected attributions of fraud that could be sustained purely based on
refusal to work.125 Here, failure to work plays an even more decisive role
because it conclusively establishes willfulness rather than merely raising
a presumption of it.
To be clear, the bare obligation to work does not trigger the Thirteenth Amendment concern. Such a legal obligation is unexceptional,
and so the courts have been understandably contemptuous of noncustodial parents who raise constitutional objections to the imposition of
the duty to pay child support and its concomitant duty to work.126 But for
this same reason, other courts have confused the issue when they have
sought to justify imprisonment for nonwork by trumpeting the validity
and wisdom of the underlying child support obligation as “not only a
moral obligation, but one that is legally enforceable.”127
Obligations to perform labor contracts are legally enforceable as
well, but the Thirteenth Amendment limits the means by which compliance may be obtained. Thus, in Moss v. Superior Court, where the obligor conceded that he could be ordered to pay support premised on his
earnings capacity, he argued that his failure to work to that capacity
nonetheless could not form the basis for imprisonment.128 A civil money
judgment was not at issue. Nor were various methods of enforcement
more aggressive than ordinary civil debt collection yet less severe than
incarceration for contempt, such as suspension of a driver’s license.129 At
first glance, then, Moss appears like prototypical involuntary servitude:
“[T]he victim had no available choice but to work or be subject to legal
sanction,”130 and the legal sanction of incarceration in particular.
More complicated is the specific relation to peonage. Like peonage,
the child support obligation to work is founded in debt. That this obligation traces to a court order rather than a private contract is less important,
because peonage includes debts “forced upon the debtor by some provision of law.”131 Nonetheless, this compulsion to work grounded in debt
differs insofar as there is no obligation to work for the creditor in child
support cases. This distinction may exclude the compulsory work pro125. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 233–37 (1911); accord Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4,
14–15 (1944).
126. See, e.g., Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Doe, 125 P.3d 461 (Haw. 2005).
127. Moss v. Superior Court, 950 P.2d 59, 67 (Cal. 1998); see also White, supra note 7, at 340
(distinguishing between a strike’s illegality under mutiny law and the withdrawal of labor law
protections).
128. Moss, 950 P.2d at 64.
129. See, e.g., LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 22.
130. Moss, 950 P.2d at 69 (quoting United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988)).
131. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215 (1905).
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duced by child support enforcement from the technical scope of “peonage” for the purpose of criminal prosecution under the Antipeonage
Act.132
That distinction between employer and creditor, however, hardly
prevents constitutional classification as involuntary servitude when
raised by the worker/obligor as a defense.133 If an obligation to Person A
can be satisfied only by working, and failure to work triggers prosecution
and imprisonment, the Thirteenth Amendment problems are scarcely affected by whether the work is for Person A or some other Person B. The
core difficulty would remain: the worker would be bound to Person B by
the carceral threat, eliminating the leverage that comes with the right to
quit and subjecting him to the risk of “a harsh overlordship.”134
B. Compulsory Work vs. Compulsory Work for a Particular Employer
As the California Supreme Court observed, however, the childsupport-derived obligation “to seek and accept employment” differs from
the peonage paradigm in a more substantial way. Not only is there no
compulsion to work for the creditor, the obligation “does not bind the
parent to any particular employer or form of employment.”135 Work at
any employer will do, and therefore the worker remains “free to leave . . .
in favor of another employer.”136 For this reason, the court concluded
that there was no need to get into the question of Thirteenth Amendment
exceptions because, without subjection “to any particular employer,”
there was no “servitude” at all.137
This is a serious and unusual point, but less impressive than it first
appears. To analyze it properly, we may usefully abstract away from the
child support context because this point does not depend upon it. Imagine
that there were a criminal statute obligating every adult to seek and maintain employment.138 This duty to work would be enforced by incarcera132. 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (2012).
133. See Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 8–10 (1944) (distinguishing between usages of peonage as a “sword” or a “shield”). Moreover, although the peonage prosecutions in the early twentieth- century era ending in Pollock all proceeded under the Antipeonage Act, Congress, in 1948,
made it a more general crime to hold someone to “involuntary servitude.” See 18 U.S.C. § 1584
(2012). Thus, the debt-related aspects of peonage appear superfluous in all respects. Indeed, when
construing § 1584 in Kozminski, the Court took the crucial aspect of the peonage cases to be that
“the victim had no available choice but to work or be subject to legal sanction,” not debt. Kozminski,
487 U.S. at 943.
134. Pollock, 322 U.S. at 18.
135. Moss, 950 P.2d at 68.
136. Id. at 71.
137. Id.
138. Vagrancy laws have sometimes functioned in roughly this fashion. See STANLEY, supra
note 69, at 99–127; Goluboff, supra note 5, at 1657–58. A full analogy to child support obligation
would provide that this employment maximize one’s earnings capacity, but we can set that aside.
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tion. Interestingly, such a regime splits apart two features of labor markets under capitalism. These often are conflated in discussions of when,
if at all, life in such markets amounts to “wage slavery,” because the only
alternative to wage work is starvation.139 On the one hand, both scenarios
allow for choice among particular employers. On the other, my hypothetical ratchets up the degree and form of compulsion; it substitutes “work
or jail” for “work or starve.”140
Would there be a “system of free labor” if labor market withdrawal
were forbidden but free circulation among employers remained? It seems
doubtful, though I cannot claim to provide a full analysis here.141 It may
be useful, however, to approach the question by asking whether such a
system would preserve the right to quit any particular employer, which is
the premise on which Moss purported to distinguish the peonage cases.
One of the peonage cases actually considered a closely related
question. In Reynolds, the Court faced peonage founded in suretyship for
criminal debts. A defendant, facing a fine that he could not pay, would be
relieved of incarceration by an employer (the surety) who paid for him
and to whom he became bound to work off the debt at an agreed rate.142
Upon quitting work for the surety, the worker faced criminal prosecution,
additional debt, and entry into another suretyship. There appeared, so far
as the Court was concerned, to be an open market in suretyships. Thus,
the worker, once he quit and faced criminal sanction, encountered no
particular pressure to return to the previous employer. The functional
result was that “under pain of recurring prosecutions, the convict may be
kept at labor, to satisfy the demands of his employer.”143
The distinction between Reynolds and a general criminalization of
unemployment is hardly apparent. In both cases, the worker is trapped in
endless labor, and the most that quitting can accomplish is to change
masters—or be incarcerated. In neither case does the worker have the
option of withdrawing from the labor market. To be sure, job switching
in Reynolds was mediated by a criminal prosecution for quitting the first
surety, but that prosecution resulted in no penalty other than a new master and deepening debt. Deepening debt meant that there was no way to
139. See Pope, supra note 6, at 1533–40.
140. Once mobility among employers is granted, Pope considers only scenarios in which the
worker retains the legal option of leaving the labor market, albeit perhaps only to starve upon exit.
Id. When Pope does consider legal limitations on leaving the labor market even to starve, it is only in
contexts (like peonage) that also involve being bound to a particular employer. Id. at 1527.
141. Cf. GOLUBOFF, supra note 5, at 157 (arguing that during the 1940s federal civil rights
enforcers “targeted laws that did not necessarily create a particular employment relationship from
which exit was difficult but rather those that made exit difficult from any employment relationship”).
142. United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 149–50 (1914).
143. Id. at 150.
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escape the cycle by accumulating the assets that would allow for labor
market withdrawal. That economic barrier to withdrawal, steep as it was,
is no more difficult to overcome than the absolute prohibition on withdrawal that I am considering. Therefore, if the withdrawal options—pay
or jail—in Reynolds were constitutionally insufficient, the same would
seem to be true for cases like Ballek and Moss.
Another way to approach the question of a general criminalization
of unemployment is to ask whether a system of compulsory labor for no
particular employer really is compatible with an unfettered right to quit
each particular employer. The work obligation would seem illusory if
one could always quit a few hours in, at least if there were any frictional
unemployment in the resulting period between jobs. Indeed, Moss itself
was cautious in its passing reference to this problem. The court implied
an unfettered right to switch employers but no such unfettered right to
quit without a new job in hand. Instead, the court allowed that the child
support obligor remained “free to resign” only if “the working conditions
are objectively intolerable.”144 Harking back to the peonage cases, one
might say that the worker retained the right to quit so long as he had
“good and sufficient cause,”145 which sounds distinctly more permissive
than “objectively intolerable.” But recall that the right to quit protected
by the peonage cases was precisely an absolute right, one not sacrificed
because it was exercised in “capricious or reprehensible” fashion.146
Although hardly definitive, this discussion suggests that criminalizing unemployment among debtors cannot easily be distinguished from
criminalizing debtors’ labor mobility between employers—the latter being the evil attacked directly in the peonage cases. At a minimum, pains
would have to be taken to avoid using the latter as a method to achieve
the former. Thus, the choice to quit a particular job could not provide the
basis for establishing inadequate efforts to work. Although such a regime
is imaginable, it would be far more protective than the one we have.
Moreover, a robust right to quit any particular job would seem to have as
its corollary a robust right to refuse any particular job; otherwise, one
would be left with the empty formalism of accepting and then immediately quitting.
C. Robertson Redux: A Child Support Exception in the Private Sector?
All this suggests that the real action in child support enforcement
must lie in the specific purpose for which work is compelled. Involuntary
144. Moss v. Superior Court, 950 P.2d 59, 71 (Cal. 1998).
145. See discussion supra note 61 and accompanying text.
146. Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25, 30 (1942); cases cited supra note 56 and accompanying
text.
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servitude it may be, but this just provides another example of the Thirteenth Amendment not really meaning what is says when declaring that
involuntary servitude “shall [not] exist within the United States.”147 Moss
offered this alternative ground for its holding, and the next year the Ninth
Circuit relied upon it exclusively, eschewing, though not rejecting,
Moss’s “no-servitude” reasoning.
In United States v. Ballek, Judge Kozinski relied on Robertson and
the other canonical exceptions cases for the proposition that “not all
forced employment is constitutionally prohibited.”148 To bring forced
child support labor within those exceptions, the court relied on the “public duties” line of cases. It reasoned that nonpayment “raises more than a
private legal dispute” but instead “is a matter of vital importance to the
community.”149 Beyond the general public concern for child welfare,
there also is the purely monetary “interest in protecting the public fisc by
ensuring that the children not become wards of the state.”150 For this reasoning, Ballek relied principally on Butler, the public roads case.
The difficulty with Ballek is that it threatens to obliterate the public/private distinction on which both Butler and Justice Harlan’s Robertson dissent relied. Previously, the “public duties” exception has been
applied exclusively to work performed directly for state entities, whether
public road crews, in the courts, or in the military. Moreover, this work
proceeded in sectors totally dominated by publicly compelled labor rather than competing with workers not subject to like compulsion. Consequently, such labor avoided triggering Pollock’s concern that coerced
labor’s “depression of working conditions and living standards affects
not only the laborer under the system, but every other with whom his
labor comes into competition.”151 No such limits apply to child support
obligations to work.
Without even noting as much, Ballek adopts the principle that
forced labor for McDonald’s or any private employer may be clothed
with sufficient public purpose to keep the Thirteenth Amendment at bay.
To transform the entire private sector into an exercise in public duty, all
that is required is for workers to spend their earnings on matters of public
concern—like paying child support. Surely this proves too much.
The public interest in private earnings is pervasive. Not only do
workers spend their money supporting family members, but they spend
147. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
148. United States v. Ballek, 170 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 1999).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 875. Recall that in much child support enforcement, this fiscal interest is not merely
prospective but instead attaches to the state’s seizure of payments in reimbursement of past assistance to a low-income child. See discussion supra note 40 and accompanying text.
151. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 18 (1944).
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their money paying taxes, supporting charitable causes, and much more.
Moreover, private employment has long been cast as the foundation of
all manner of public virtues, from social integration, to the cultivation of
self-discipline, to the instruction of children, to the economic independence on which republican conceptions of political citizenship depend.152
In other words, Ballek slams a wedge deep into the crack left open
by Robertson: if the “public duty” class of exceptions can be extended to
encompass work for private employers, then it can, in principle, be extended to most modern employment. Doing so, however, threatens the
premise that rendered those exceptions tolerable. Pollock declared that
the Thirteenth Amendment aimed “not merely to end slavery but to
maintain a system of completely free and voluntary labor throughout the
United States.”153 It countenanced the occasional oddball exception because “forced labor in special circumstances may be consistent with the
general basic system of free labor.”154 Ballek’s reasoning, however,
would allow the exception to swallow the rule.
CONCLUSION
These last observations point to the perpetual frailty of public/private distinctions. As the Realists taught, the “private” economy is a
creature of public law, designed to serve public purposes ranging from
the sustenance of daily life to the cultivation of individual liberty to the
maintenance of democratic politics.155 Moreover, economically significant work pervades the regions sometimes deemed outside the market, as
the cases of public roads and military service readily demonstrate. Indeed, private labor markets routinely are marshaled to supply the labor
necessary to advance employers’ “noneconomic” purposes.156 Churches,
prisons, and schools all hire janitors and secretaries, including those motivated just to make a living and not by loyalty to the employer’s ultimate
goals. Similarly, someone flipping burgers for McDonald’s may do so to
earn wages devoted to child support, college tuition, political or religious

152. See generally WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS (1996); Vicki
Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881 (2000).
153. WILSON, supra note 152, at 17.
154. Id. at 18.
155. See, e.g., Carole Pateman, Democratizing Citizenship: Some Advantages of a Basic
Income, 32 POL. & SOC’Y 89 (2004); Fred Block & Peter Evans, The State and the Economy, in THE
HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 505 (Neil J. Smelser & Richard Swedberg eds., 2005);
Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470
(1923).
156. See Noah D. Zatz, Does Work Law Have a Future If the Labor Market Does Not?, 91
CHI.-KENT L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
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donations, and so on, even if the employer is motivated to hire her just to
make a buck.
Taking these points fully to heart threatens basic structures in which
the Thirteenth Amendment is embedded and which it has helped bring
about. Pending a solution to the contradictions of a liberal political economy, perhaps it is worthwhile to try taking the public/private distinction
seriously. If we did so, then it would seem that Justice Harlan should
again be vindicated, that Robertson should be overruled, and that today’s
criminalization of unemployment should be scrutinized as a new peonage
that threatens our most basic freedoms. The conclusion is only strengthened by the ways in which this new peonage, like the old one, emerges
from, ratifies, and exploits white supremacy.

